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An Ethical Evaluation of Federal Norms
for Fetal Experimentation
Kevin O'Rourke, O.P.

Father O'Rourke is Director of
the Medical-Moral Department of
the Catholic Hospital Association
in St. Louis. In this article, he
raises some questions regarding
the work which was done by the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.

In July, 1974, Congress passed
the National Research Act which
imposed a temporary moratorium
on research on human fetuses,
either before or after induced
abortion, if carried out or financed by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare
(DHEW). The act also created
the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research to study the legal, ethical,
and medical aspects of scientific
research upon human subjects. I
The first task assigned by Congress to the commission was extremely difficult. The commission
was asked to explore fetal experimentation, an extremely controversial topic, and to submit
recommendations concerning such
experimentation to the secretary,
DHEW. This study required that
the demands and necessities of a
pluralistic society, as well as the
dignity of human subjects and the
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needs of scientific progress, be
considered. On May 21, 1975, the
commission submitted its recommendations to Secretary Caspar
W. Weinberger. In August, Weinberger lifted the year-long ban on
fetal research and issued federal
regulations for fetal experimentation which, for the most part, are
consistent with the commission's
recommendations. The regulations, along with the full report
of the commission, were published
in the Federal Register, August'
8, 1975."
Given the difficulty of the task,
the brief time frame allowed for
formulating norms, and the novelty of the assignment, the commission should be commended for its
sincere and open-minded effort.
Moreover, it deserves praise fol'
the method followed. i.e., first
stating principles that It intended
to follow and then applying these
principles to the various types of
fetuses that might be used for experimentation or research. However, the work of the commission
has one serious drawback: the
recommendations fail to apply the
principles consistently and accurately. As a consequence, the
fed e l' a I regulations, consistent
with the recommendations, call
into question centuries of humane
tradition whereby the human
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rights of the weak and infirm
have been protected.
Because the matter of human
research and experimentation is
so important, not only for the
future of medical research but for
the future quality of human relationships in our society, it will be
worthwhile to present the principles for research upon human
subjects formulated by the commission and how some of the recommendations fail to meet the
standards set by these principles.
I. The Principles of
Medical Research
The commission lists the following four principles "among the
general principles for research on
human subjects judged to be valid
and binding:
1. To avoid harm whenever possi ·
ble, or at least to minimize h arm;

2. To provide for fair treatment by
avoiding discrimination between
classes or among members of the
same class (referred to later as
the principle of equality) ;
3. To respect the integrity of hu ·
m a n subjects by requiring in·
formed con sent ;
4. To respect t he human character
of the fetus." (VIII. B).

Later, when discussing the matter of risk and consent, the commission lists a fifth principle:
"The commission affirms as a ge n·
eral principle that manifest ri sks
imposed on nonconsenting subjects
cannot be tolerated. Therefore, the
commission concludes that only
minimal risk can be accepted as
permissible for nonconsenting sub·
jects in nontherapeutic research."
(VIII, C, 3).
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In addition to these five principles, the commission states that
certain general requirements are
necessary for ethical research
upon fetuses. These would be ascertained in the review process
which must precede approval of
any research project. These gEmeral requirements are:
1. " Appropriate prior investigations
using a nimal models and non·
pregnant huma ns must h ave been
completed.

2. The knowledge to be ga ined
must be importa nt and obtain·
a ble by no reasonable alternative
means.
3. Risks a nd benefits to both the
mother and the fetus must have
been fully evaluated and de·
scribed.
4. Informed consent must be sought
a nd granted under proper con ditions.
5. Subjects must be selected so that
risks a nd benefi ts will not fall
inequita bly among economic, ra·
cia l, ethni c, and social classes."
(V III, C, 3).

Each of these principles and requirements is valid, and each protects and / or fosters the dignity
of human subjects of research and
experimentation. If they had been
applied consistently in accord
with the express intention of the
commission to treat the fetus as
"a human subject," then a humane and acceptable set of recommendations could have been
formulated. But the principles
were not applied consistently.
One reason for the lack of consistency and accuracy in applying
these principles may have been
insufficient time. The commission
admitted that it was "placed unLinacre Quarterly

der severe limitation of time by its
Congressional mandate. As a result, these considerations on research involving fetuses have necessarily been developed prior to
the commission's larger task of
studying the nature of research,
t.he basic ethical principles which
should guide it, the problem of
informed consent and the review
process." (VIII). Hence, the commission admitted that it "has not
yet studied the issues surrounding
informed consent for non therapeutic research." (VIII, C). Yet
it proceeded to approve recommendations, which in order to be
just and humane, require a clear
notion of the principle of informed
consent as well as the import of
its corrollary; manifest risks imposed upon nonconsenting subjects cannot be tolerated.
Clearly, the commission should
have finished the consideration
concerning consent before formuI a tin g recommendations. This
would have been more important
than meeting the Congressional
deadline. Consent is, after all, the
heart of the matter for human research. The ramifications of contradicting the p r inc i pie of
informed consent for harmful experimentation are far-reaching.
Our civilization is based upon respect for individual dignity and
equality; one of its highest ideals
is to protect the weak and infirm
from harm; it professes that the
individual does not exist for the
state and cannot be sacrificed unwillingly for public welfare. All
these values might be endangered
if the principles of informed conFebruary, 1976

sent are not followed faithfully.
By proceeding as it did, the commission opted for an interpretation of this principle that is so
broad it is meaningless.

II. The Specific
Recommendations
In order to show the specific instances where the conclusions of
the commission are not in accord
with the principles it avows, let us
study the recommendations in
greater detail.
The first two recommendations
concern therapeutic research, the
first considering research upon
the fetus and the second concerned with research upon pregnant women. The first is adequate, but the second gives cause
for concern. The reason for concern is that research directed primarily toward the pregnant woman in many cases will affect the
fetus as well, and it is important
that the rights of the fetus be
protected. Recognizing that "the
therapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman may
expose the fetus to risk for the
benefit of another subject," the
commission makes some effort to
protect the fetus by stating that
the research upon pregnant women may be supported provided
that such research will "put the
fetus at minimum risk consistent
with the provision of health care
for the woman." (VIII, C, 2). But
the actual protection afforded the
fetus is extremely tenuous because the commission also recognizes "the woman's p rio r i t Y
regarding her own health care."
This latter phrase would allow
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research that would injure or even
destroy the fetus if it were "consistent with the health needs of
the mother." If the term "health
of the mother" is interpreted as
it was in the Supreme Court decision regarding abortion (and
there is no reason to think it will
not be), then any research which
treats a pregnant woman for emotional or psychological difficulty,
as well as for physiological maladies, could justify research endangering the fetus . In such cases,
the fetus would not be treated as
a "human subject in scientific research" as the commission avowed
it should. Rather, in spite of some
palliative language, the fetus is
treated as a thing, to be disposed
of if the "health needs of the pregnant woman" warrant it.
Acknowledging the Sup rem e
Court's decisions which subordinated the fetus' right to life and
the right to due process of the
woman's right to privacy (Roe vs.
Wade, Doe vs. Bolton), the commission might have felt unable to
give greater recognition to the
fetus' right to be considered a human subject. But if the Supreme
Court's decision is to be used as
the guiding standard for formuI a tin g f eta I experimentation
norms, then the effort to formulate humane norms is worthless
from the beginning. Why spend
time debating when and how fetal
experimentation can take place if
the fetus has no right to be treated as a human subject, no right to
life, and no right to human dignity? Rig h tfu I consideration
would be given to the fetus if the
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clause "consistent with meeting
the health needs of the pregnant
woman" were eliminated, and the
woman's health did not receive
priority. In this way, the rights
of the fetus and those of the woman would be balanced One against
the other and protected equally.
Even though the Supreme Court
has denied the human fetus equal
protection under law under the
guise of the right to privacy, the
commission should not have made
the same mistake under the guise
of therapeutic research.
Non-Therapeutic Research
In recommendation 3, the commission considers non therapeutic
research directed toward the pregnant woman. Once again, the key
question is: will the fetus be respected as a human subject? The
commission seems to recognize
the right of the fetus to be protected for it concludes in recommendatIOn 3 that nontherapeutic
research directed toward a pregnant woman should be funded
only if the research "a) has been
evaluated for possible impact upon the well-being of the fetus; and
b) will impose minimal or no risk
to the well-being of the fetus."
However, the commission also admits that ((the term minimal in.volves a value j u dg men t and
acknowledges that medical opin.ion will differ regarding what constitutes minimal risk ." (VIII, C.
3). The main factor causing differences of opinion about minimal
risk is whether or not the fetus
will be aborted. Minimal risk for
a fetus going' to term is, different, according to some commisLinacre Quarterfy

sion members, from one that will
be aborted. The thought seems to
be: if the fetus is going to be destroyed, then less care need be
devoted to it.
The commission states that in
any research procedure, the "determination of acceptable minimal risk is a function of the
review process." But the door is
clearly open for those who conduct the review process to use
more lenient norms for minimal
risk in the case of fetuses to be
aborted than for those who will
be carried to term. According to
the report, "there"is a basic agreement among commission members
as to the validity of the equality
principle. There is disagreement
as to its application to individual
fetuses and classes of fetuses ."
(VIII, C, 3). It seems. however,
that the absence of more definite
protection from harmful experimentation for the fetus to be
aborted amounts to a disavowal
and contradiction of the equality
principle, not merely a disagreement in regard to its application.
Indeed, to allow human subjects
to be used for medical research
experimentation simply because
they will soon die, especially if
t he research might be harmful ,
endangers the humane tradition
of western civilization. If the commission wished to grant the fetus
its rights as a human subject, it
would have refused to consider
the possibihty of any research
which would allow the fetus to be
treated differently simply because
it would later be aborted. This
would put "minima} risk" into
February, 1976

proper context. The commISSIOn
considered this possibility and rejected it. (VIII, C, 3).
The f 0 u r t h recommendation
concerns non therapeutic research
directed toward the fetus in utero
when abortion is not anticipated .
This recommendation affords ample protection to the fetus, and
were it applied to fetuses that will
be aborted, the commission would
have been acting in accord with
its principles. Instead, the commission treated fetuses in utero
that would be aborted in a sepa - .
rate section, recommendation 5.
Recommendation 5 has two serious shortcomings: first of all, it
allows for the same ambig1::lous
interpretation of minimal risk in
the case of fetuses to be aborted
that was mentioned in regard to
recommendation 3. Secondly, it
contains an " escape clause" which
states:
"resea rch presenting special prob ·
le ms related to the interpretation or
appli cation of these guidelines may
be conducted or supported by the
DHEW secretary, provided that
such resea rch has been approved by
a ' nat.ional ethi cal review body,'"

What "special problems" might
be used to justify different treatment - for ·fe t uses to be aborted,
the -commission does no t declare,
but judging from some of the
exp e r i ill e n ts that have been
performed on aborted fetuses
throughout the world, this clause
could open a pandora's box. Moreover, it violates the principle of
eq uality as weIl as the principle
that only minimal risk can be accepted as permissible for subjects
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in nontherapeutic research. As
David Louisell, a committee member who felt obliged to write a
minority report, declared, "this
clause should be omitted and in
its place there should be a declaration that no research should
be permitted on a fetus to be
aborted that would not be permitted on one to go to term." The
decision that a woman makes to
have an abortion should not make
it possible for a human fetus to be
misused, no matter what national
interest or medical knowledge
might be involved.
Dying Fetuses
Recommendation 6, concerning
nontherapeutic res ear c h upon
fetuses that are dying, that is,
research directed toward the fetus
during the abortion process and
the nonviable fetus ex utero. The
commission seemingly makes an
effort to protect these fetuses by
requiring that "no significant procedural changes are introduced
into the abortion procedure in the
interest of research alone; and no
intrusion into the fetus is made
which alters the duration of life."
But there is no requirement which
would protect the dying fetus
fro m harmful experimentation
which did not shorten or lengthen
its life. The mere fact that a fetus
is dying, no matter from what
cause, is not sufficient grounds
for allowing experimentation upon
it, especially harmful experimentation, or for withdrawing the
protection afforded other human
subjects. Would we experiment
with dying adults if we did not
have their consent? Would we
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carry out harmful experimentations upon dying children, even if
their parents gave proxy consent?
It seems that the commission is
following the thought of the Supreme Court, and depriving the
fetus to be aborted of all human
consideration. If the commission
wishes to treat the dying fetus as
a "human subject in scientific research," and if it wishes to apply
consistently the p r inc i pIe of
equality, then it must consider
how other dying members of soor shortened by proposed research.
and experimentation are under
considera tion.
The harmful "escape clause"
appended to recommendation 5 is
also contained in recommendation
6. Given this opening, the DHEW
secretary, Cas par Weinberger,
made the federal regulation concerning dying fetuses even more
premissive than the recommendation of the commission. The commission had stated that the dying
fetus's life could not be extended
or shortened by proposed research.
However, the Federal Regulations
reverses this position, explaining:
"the secretary is persua d ed by the
weight of scientific evidence that re search pe rformed on the nonvia ble
fetus ex utero has contributed
substantially to the ability of physician~ to bring to viability inc reas ingly small fetuses. The secretary
perceives that it is in the public interest to continue this successful
research and accordingly an exemption is m a de to the recommendation
of the commission to permit research to develop new methods for
enabling fetuses to survive to the
point of viability. "
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Advancing the state of medical
knowledge that more immature
fetuses can survive is indeed a
worthy goal, but the means approved by the Federal Regulations are highly unethical. The
Regulations would allow for harmful experimentation upon dying
fetuses, would allow its life to be
shortened or lengthened, would
allow fetuses to be harvested and
maintained for the sole purpose
of research. By means of this regulation the fetus can be treated as
a thing, with no dignity or rights
of its own. Even those who would
not give full human rights to the
fetus, must think long and hard
about this regulation and its implications for the future. It represents a breakdown, a denial, of
the total medical, ethical and social standards of our society. If
fetuses can be treated as things
in the interest of "society or medical progress," then so can anyone
else.
Possibly Viable Infants and
Dead Fetuses
The seventh recommendation
concerns research directed toward
the possibly viable infant. Here
the requirements are sound and
well stated, being based upon the
conviction "that there is a moral
legal obligation to attempt to save
the life of a possibly viable infant." (VIII, C, 4). Recommendation 9 stipulates the conditions
for research on dead fetuses and
fetal tissue. Hence, the commission recommends that such "research be permitted if consistent
with local law, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and commonly
February, 1976

held convictions about respect
for the dead." What these " commonly held convictions about
respect for the dead" are, the
commission does not state. Certainly, disputes will arise concerning the practical implementation
of this recommendation, but accepted protocol for research upon
dead adults could serve as a guide
for conducting the review process
on research on dead fetuses. For
example, some thought should be
given to the matter of consent.
Who will give the consent needed
to release dead fetuses for research? Would the mother of an
aborted fetus have relinquished
this right by reason of her decision to have the fetus destroyed?
Would the court be empowered to
grant this permission? Or would
it be presumed that dead fetuses,
unlike dead children or dead
adults, are public property and
can be disposed of indiscriminately? In many countries where abortion is commonplace, scandalous
practices, such as buying and selling dying and dead fetuses, have
occurred. Firm steps should be
taken to avoid the possibility of
this happening in the United
States. While the dead fetus cannot be harmed by such practices,
one of the principles of the commission is that the human character of the fetus should be respected. This demands some control over the way fetuses are provided for experimentation, even
if they are no longer living. Moreover, concern for the dead and the
way their remains are treated is
also a measure of the humanity
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of the living.
The other recommendations, 8
and 10 through 16, concern the
review process, rights of conscience which allow one to refuse
to participate in a research activity if contrary to his moral convictions or religious beliefs, and
certain requirements for the procedures of research . While all
t hese recommendations have ethical implications, they are not directly connected with the principles enunciated by t he commission.
Conclusion
Because the federal regulations
for fetal experimentation, based
upon the recommendations of the
commission, have now been promulgated by the Secretary of
DHEW, it would seem that the
issue of their merit is closed. But
this is not the case. In the firs t
place, views and argumen ts relating to the recommendat ions of
the commission may be sent to
the DHEW secretary, and on the
basis of such considerations, the
DHEW secretary "may proceed
to further proposed rule making
and possible amendments to the
regulations as issued."
In the second place, let us realize that the matter of fetal experimentation was brought into
the public forum because of public concern. The concern of " ordinary people" not only led to t he
actions taken by Congress in regard to fetal experimentation, it
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also caused 15 states to ban compIe t e ly fetal experimentation.
Hence, if these federal regulations
do not seem to express a consensus acceptable to the people,
perhaps the matter will be in the
hands of Congress once again. As
one writer observed, "At a minimum, American re s ear c her s
should understand that they face
a legislative ban on experimentation unless a compromise solution
is adopted."4 Could these recommendations which form the
substance of the federal regulations be called a compromise? Do
they express a general consensus
for a pluralistic society if they
violate the principles of equality
and informed consent and allow
human subjects to be treated as
things in the interest of research?
While appreciating all the beneficial work that the commission
produced, con c ern e d persons
should offer to their elected representatives a polite but firm objection to the Federal Regula t ions
as they now stand.
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